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This is the online appendix for “Networks, Frictions, and Price Dispersion” by Javier Donna, Pablo
Schenone, and Gregory Veramendi.
B Other Related Literature
Since we model markets of buyers and sellers, our paper relates to other fields such as matching,
financial networks, and computer science. Here we briefly relate our paper to these other fields.
Our paper is related to the literature on the matching role of markets (e.g. Gale and Shapley
1962; Shapley and Shubik 1972; Shapley and Scarf 1974; Crawford and Knoer 1981; Kelso and
Crawford 1982; Ausubel and Milgrom 2002; Hatfield and Milgrom (2005); and Hatfield and Kojima
2008, 2010).1 We follow the matching literature by developing a deferred-acceptance algorithm
that picks specific stable matchings. The algorithm has two stages. The first stage outputs an
allocation and is motivated by the wage adjusting process in Crawford and Knoer (1981) and
Kelso and Crawford (1982). This allocation has the property that there exist prices for which it is
pairwise stable. The second stage outputs two prices: the pointwise minimum price at which the
stage 1 allocation is stable, and the pointwise maximum price at which the stage 1 allocation is
stable.2
There is also a growing literature that uses networks to study trading in financial settings
such as over-the-counter (OTC) markets (e.g. Gofman 2011; Malamud and Rostek 2013; Babus
and Kondor 2013; and Alvarez and Barlevy 2014). They use concrete games to investigate OTC
markets where dealers trade with other dealers. In contrast, we study markets where the set of
sellers and buyers belong to two disjoint sets: sellers can only trade with buyers while buyers can
only trade with sellers (i.e. bipartite networks as defined in section 2 in the paper).
In the computer science literature, Kakade, Kearns, and Ortiz (2004) study trade using an
Arrow-Debreu economy (without firms) where consumers trade goods with other consumers.
Kakade, Kearns, Ortiz, Pemantle, and Suri (2004) use a concrete game to study the interaction
between the statistical structure of the underlying network and the variation in prices at equilib-
rium.3 Our model also relates to the classical assignment problem. The goal of this literature is
to develop efficient algorithms (e.g. Hungarian algorithm, auction algorithms, simplex algorithms,
etc.) to maximize total output in a setup similar to ours (i.e. obtain the Pareto efficient matching).
The first stage of our algorithm is similar to the auction algorithm which is known to perform well
with sparse matrices (see Bertsekas 1992 for a survey). The goal of the algorithms literature is to
find one allocation and possibly one price per match that maximizes output. In contrast, the goal
of our algorithm is to find the set of prices that support pairwise stable allocations and study the
relationship between frictions and price dispersion.
C Non-Maximal Abstractions
Proposition 1. Let N be a network and M be a matching. Then the following are equivalent:
1Roth (2008) discusses recent progress in the study of deferred-acceptance algorithms. See Roth and Sotomayor
(1990) for a comprehensive survey of the two-sided matching literature.
2See section 3.2 for details.
3Kakade, Kearns, Ortiz, Pemantle, and Suri (2004) analyze networked markets where the numbers of buyers
and sellers are equal. They show that, for their particular game, there is no equilibrium price dispersion when the
following conditions hold: (1) the number of buyers and sellers go to infinity, (2) the links are formed uniformly at
random, and (3) the probability of forming a link is high enough. In their model there is limiting price dispersion
(as the number of buyers and sellers go to infinity) when the network is formed via preferential attachment. In
contrast, the only constraint we impose on allocations is that they be pairwise stable. So our results are game-free.
In addition, in our simulations we study price dispersion in bipartite networks varying arbitrarily the number of
buyers, the number of sellers, and the number of links per seller or buyer.
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1. There exists a price function, pM , such that M is pairwise stable in N at prices pM .
2. There exists an abstraction of N in fully connected networks, A, and a price function ρ for
A, such that ρ supports M in A.
While most of the intuition for our results comes from Proposition 1, this proposition does not
characterize the full set of prices that support any given pairwise stable match. Proposition 1 tells
us that any matching that is pairwise stable in a network, N , is also pairwise stable with respect
to some price function, ρ, for some abstraction of N . Let A denote one such abstraction, and P∗
denote the set of prices that support M in A. Then, each ρ ∈ P∗ induces a price function for N
that supportsM . Thus, given a matching, an abstraction that does not break the matching induces
prices that support it. However, there might be other prices that also support the matching, which
are not induced by a price that supports the matching in that particular abstraction. The example
below shows this.
Example 1. In this example we present a network (left) and construct two abstractions from it.
Assume that the valuations of the buyers are ordered as their labels (µ(A) > µ(B) > µ(C) > µ(D)),
and costs are normalized to 0.
Abstraction in Maximal Abstraction
Network Fully-connected in Fully-connected
Subnetworks Subnetworks
1
2
3
A
B
C
D
BuyersSellers
1
2
3
A
C
B
D
G
G′
1
2
3
A
C
B
D
G
G′′′
G′′
The abstraction in the middle imposes two constraints that prices need to satisfy in order to make
the matching pairwise stable in the abstraction: stability in every subnetwork implies ρ(G) ∈ [0, µ(C)],
ρ(G′) ∈ [µ(D), µ(B)]; cheapest sorting implies ρ(G′) ≤ ρ(G). Let P∗ be set of price functions satisfying
these conditions. Notice that any ρ ∈ P∗ induces prices in the original network (say, pM ) that support
M . However, there are other prices (say, p′M ) that also support M in the original network but are not
induced by any ρ ∈ P∗. For example, p′M (1, A) = p′M (2, C) = µ(C) and p′M (3, B) = µ(B) support M
in the original network, but is not induced by prices in P∗.
Now, consider the abstraction on the right. The following are the constraints on prices that support
M in the abstraction: ρ(G) ∈ [µ(D), µ(C)], ρ(G′′) ∈ [µ(D), µ(B)]. Now, any price function pM that
makes M pairwise stable in the original network is induced by a price function, ρ, that satisfies the
above constraints.
Proposition 1 identifies a class of abstractions, which we call maximal, such that the con-
straints imposed by these abstractions are necessary and sufficient for stability. An example of a
maximal abstraction is the rightmost abstraction in example 1. Thus, the maximality property of
an abstraction buys us the full set of prices at which a matching is stable, not just a subset.
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D Formal algorithm and proof of Proposition 3
In this appendix we discuss the formal algorithm used in the main paper and prove some of
its properties. We now present the basic notation we use in the match determination program. Let
st ∈ RJ×I be a matrix of prices for each seller-buyer pair. Each element, sti,j, represents the price
that buyer j would have to bid for seller i if j were to bid for i in round t. Vector qt represents
the bidding queue in period t: qtn = j ∈ J represents that in round t, buyer j is the n-th bidder
in the queue. The algorithm ends when l(q) = 0, where l(q) indicates the length of q. Quantity
D(j) indicates j’s demand. Quantities with primes will indicate quantities that will carry over to
the next round of the algorithm. Finally, for each seller j, we use the following payoff function
to model that a buyer can only buy a good from a seller if the two are linked in the network:
uj : I × RI×J :→ R̄, uj(i, s) = µ(j)− si,j if (i, j) ∈ E and uj(i, s) = −∞ otherwise.
Recall some notational conventions: given a matching M , i∗(·) : J → I ∪ {∅} satisfies
(i∗(j), j) ∈M for each M -matched j, and i∗(j) = ∅ if j is M -unmatched. Analogously, j∗(·) : I →
J ∪ {∅} satisfies (i, j∗(i)) ∈ M for each M -matched i, and j∗(i) = ∅ if i is M -unmatched. Also,
even if not explicitly stated, the network is denoted N = (I,J , E;µ(·)), I = #I, J = #J , and
µ(s) = b ∈ R for all s. This last normalization is simply for convenience of the simulation.
Match Determination Program.
Input= (N , s0, (u1, ..., uJ), h0, q) where:
• s0 = (s01, ..., s0J) ∈ RJ×I , s0j = (b, ..., b) ∈ RI ,
• For each buyer j, and each t ∈ N∪{0}, uj(i, st) = µ(j)− sti,j if (i, j) ∈ E and uj(i, st) = −∞
if (i, j) /∈ E,
• h0 = (0, ..., 0) ∈ RI×J .
• q0 ∈ J J such that q0n = q0m iff m = n.
Start step R(1):
R(t). Set ht = h, st = s, qt = q, j = q1.
1. If max{uj(i, s) : i ∈ I} < 0 set s′ = s and h′ = h, q′ = (q2, ..., ql(q)).
a. If l(q′) = 0, stop, set M = {(i, j) : hi,j = 1}, and Output= M .
b. If l(q′) 6= 0, set qt+1 = q′, st+1 = s′, ht+1 = h′ and proceed to R(t+ 1).
2. If max{uj(i, s) : i ∈ I} ≥ 0 let D(j) ∈ arg max{uj(i, s) : i ∈ I}.
a. If arg max{uj(i, s) : i ∈ I} has more than one element, selectD(j) ∈ arg maxi∈I{uj(i, s)}
randomly.
3. Set the following parameters:
a. s′D(j),j = sD(j),j; for all j
′ 6= j, s′D(j),j′ = sD(j),j +
∆
2
; s′i′′,j′′ = si′′,j′′ elsewhere,
b. If hD(j),j′ = 0 for all j′ 6= j, set q′ = (q2, ..., ql(q)); if hD(j),j′ = 1 for some j′ 6= j, set
q′ = (q2, ..., ql(q), j
′),
c. h′D(j),j = 1; for all j
′ 6= j, h′D(j),j′ = 0; h′i′′,j′′ = hi′′,j′′ elsewhere.
4. If l(q′) = 0, stop. Set M = {(i, j) : hi,j = 1}. Output= M .
If l(q) 6= 0 set h′ = ht+1 and s′ = st+1 and q′ = qt+1. Then start R(t+ 1).
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Although this algorithm is motivated by Crawford and Knoer (1981) and Kelso and Crawford
(1982), there are three important differences. The first is that firm productivities increase in
increments of ∆ whereas bids increase in increments of ∆
2
. Since Crawford and Knoer (1981) and
Kelso and Crawford (1982) work with a discrete core, the algorithm they run produces a stable
match when both bid increments and productivities increase by the same amount. However, since
we work with a continuous core, it is not true that the matching generated by such an algorithm is
stable. One can construct examples where the matching generated by the algorithms in Crawford
and Knoer (1981) and Kelso and Crawford (1982) (say, M) satisfies that there is no price function
pM such that M is stable with respect to pM . We provide one example in section G (Figure A1).
The modification we introduce, that bids live in a finer grid than firm productivities, helps us
bypass this problem. The second difference with the algorithms in Crawford and Knoer (1981)
and Kelso and Crawford (1982) is that we only use their program to find the matching, but not
the prices that make it stable. The reason is that their algorithm makes prices rise too quickly.
While in some networks the price generated by the algorithms in Crawford and Knoer (1981) and
Kelso and Crawford (1982) is the pointwise minimum price that makes the matching stable, this is
not always guaranteed. This is because in our setting we violate the non-indifference assumptions
made in Crawford and Knoer (1981) and Kelso and Crawford (1982). In order to capture, for
each matching, the pointwise maximum and minimum prices at which that matching is stable we
run two independent programs. We call these the Price Determination Programs, and we describe
them below. The first Price Determination Program (I), outputs the pointwise minimum price
function at which a matching is stable. The second Price Determination program (II), outputs
the pointwise maximum price function at which a matching is stable. The third difference is that,
when a seller i accepts a bid from a buyer j, then any future bid buyer j′ submits to i must outbid
j’s bid. In symbols, if in round t seller i accepts bid sti,j from j, then at the end of round t all
sellers j′ linked to i have their bid price raised to st+1i,j′ = s
t
i,j +
∆
2
. This modification reduces the
run time of the algorithm by a factor of four.
Price Determination Program (I).
Input= (N ,M).
1. For each i ∈ I such that j∗(i) = ∅ set ρ1i = b.
2. For each i ∈ I such that j∗(i) 6= ∅ set
ρ1i =
{
max{µ(j) : (i, j) ∈ E and i∗(j) = ∅} if {µ(j) : (i, j) ∈ E and i∗(j) = ∅} 6= ∅
b if {µ(j) : (i, j) ∈ E and i∗(j) = ∅} = ∅
3. Set t = 1. Start step 4(1).
4(t). Given (ρt1, ..., ρtI):
a. For each i ∈ I such that j∗(i) = ∅ set ρt+1i = ρti.
b. For each i ∈ I such that j∗(i) 6= ∅, let j ≡ j∗(i). Then, set
ρt+1i = max{ρ
t
i′ : (∃j′)(i′, j′) ∈M , (i, j′) ∈ E}.
c. If for all i ∈ I ρt+1i = ρti:
∗ For each i such that j∗(i) 6= ∅ set pM (i, j∗(i)) = ρt+1i .
∗ Output= (pM (·)).
d. Otherwise, start step 4(t+ 1).
Price Determination program (I) outputs the minimum price at which M can be made stable.
Price Determination Program (II).
Input= (N ,M).
1. For each i ∈ I such that j∗(i) = ∅ set ρ1i = b.
2. For each i ∈ I such that j∗(i) 6= ∅ set ρ1i = µ(j∗(i)).
3. Set t = 1. Start step 4(1).
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4(t). Given (ρt1, ..., ρtI):
a. For each i ∈ I such that j∗(i) = ∅ set ρt+1i = ρti.
b. For each i ∈ I such that j∗(i) 6= ∅, let j ≡ j∗(i). Then, set
ρt+1i = min{ρ
t
i′ : (i
′, j) ∈ E}.
c. If for all i ∈ I ρt+1i = ρti:
∗ For each i such that j∗(i) 6= ∅ set pM (i, j∗(i)) = ρt+1i .
∗ Output= (pM (·)).
d. Otherwise, start step 4(t+ 1).
Price Determination program (II) outputs the maximum price at which M can be made stable.
In section 3.2 we claimed our algorithm has four properties: it ends in finite time, it selects a pairwise stable
allocation, and for each allocation it selects the pointwise minimum and maximum prices that sustain it.
Proposition 3: The deferred acceptance algorithm has the following properties:
1. It stops after a finite number of rounds.
2. It outputs a pairwise stable allocation.
3. Price Determination program (I) outputs the pointwise minimum price function at which M
is stable.
4. Price Determination program (II) outputs the pointwise maximum price function at which
M is stable.
We now prove these items one at a time. In what follows, we use MDP and PDP to abbreviate
the Matching Determination Program and the Price Determination Program respectively. Finally,
if (xi)i∈I is a vector indexed by I we use the convenient shorthand notation x· to denote the whole
vector, whenever ambiguity is unlikely.
We need two lemmas: the first, shows that, given M produced by the MDP, there exist
prices pM such that M is stable with respect to M . The second shows that the prices generated
by the PDP are weakly lower than any pM such that M is stable with respect to M . To prove
these Lemmas, recall that (ρti)i∈I,t≥1 from the PDP(I) is defined as follows:
• If j∗(i) = ∅, ρti = b for all t.
• If j∗(i) = j for some j ∈ J , ρ1i = max{µ(j) : (i, j) ∈ E, i∗(j) = ∅} for each i ∈ I, and
ρti = max{ρt−1i′ : (∃j′, i′) : (j′, i′) ∈M , (j′, i) ∈ E} for all t ≥ 2.
The following properties imply that there exists a value T such that, for all i and all t ≥ T ,
ρti = ρ
t+1
i . That is, (ρt·)t≥0 is eventually constant. We let ρ∞· ≡ limt→∞ ρt· .
1. For all i, ρti ≤ ρt+1i . This follows because ρt−1i ∈ {ρt−1i′ : (∃j′) : (j′, i′) ∈ M , (j′, i) ∈ E}
whenever j∗(i) = j and ρti = b whenever j∗(i) = ∅.
2. For all i, ρti ≤ max{µ(j) : j ∈ J }.
3. For all i, if ρti 6= ρt+1i then ρt+1i − ρti ≥ ∆.
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Finally, recall that ∆ ∈ R is chosen so that for all j ∈ J , µ(j) = b+ kj∆ for for kj ∈ N ∪ {0}. In
particular, µ(j) ≥ b for all j. This normalization only rules out uninteresting cases where a buyer
never places a bid and is never matched to a seller.
Lemma 1. Let M be the matching produced by the MDP. Then, there exists pM such that M is
stable with respect to pM .
Proof. For each edge (i, j) ∈ M define pM(i, j) = ρ∞i where (ρti)i∈J ,t∈N∪{∞} is as defined in the
PDP(I). Also, let T be the last round of the MDP and let [sTi,j]i∈I,j∈J be the matrix of final prices
generated by the MDP. We show that M is stable with respect to pM . Assume first that (i, j) ∈ E
are such that j∗(i) = i∗(j) = ∅. Then i received no bids, so sTi,j = b. Since the algorithm ended,
it must be that uj(i, sT ) < 0 ⇔ µ(j) < b, a contradiction. Thus, there does not exist an edge
(i, j) ∈ E such that j∗(i) = i∗(j) = ∅ so, a fortiori, no such edge (i, j) ∈ E blocks M . Now
let (i, j) ∈ M . Pick j′ 6= j such that (i, j′) ∈ E. We show (i, j′) ∈ E does not block M . If
i∗(j′) = ∅ then µ(j′) ≤ ρ1i ≤ ρ∞i = pM(i, j). If i∗(j′) 6= ∅ then ρ∞i ≥ ρ∞i∗(j′) by construction.
Thus, pM(i, j) ≥ pM(i∗(j′), j′). Thus, (i, j′) does not block M . Pick i′ 6= i such that (i′, j) ∈ E.
We show (i′, j) ∈ E does not block M . If j∗(i′) 6= ∅ then ρ∞i′ ≥ ρ∞i by construction. Thus,
pM(i
′, j∗(i′)) ≥ pM(i, j). Let j∗(i′) = ∅. Then i′ never received a bid. Let t be the last time j
bids for i. Since bidders bid for the cheapest seller sti,j ≤ sti′,j = b. By definition of t, sti,j = sTi,j
so sTi,j = pM(i, j) = b. We use this to argue that ρ1î = b for all matched î such that (i, j
∗(̂i)) ∈ E
(note that i is one such î). Pick î such that j∗(̂i) 6= ∅ and (i, j∗(̂i)) ∈ E. Then, sT
î,j∗ (̂i)
≤ sT
i,j∗ (̂i)
.
4 Since sTi,j = b and sTi,j∗ (̂i) ≤ s
T
i,j +
∆
2
, then sT
î,j∗ (̂i)
≤ b + ∆
2
. If there exists j̃ such that i∗(j̃) = ∅
and (̂i, j̃) ∈ E, then it must be that µ(j̃) = b. Indeed, if µ(j̃) > b then µ(j̃) ≥ b + ∆ which is
a contradiction: since sT
î,j∗ (̂i)
≤ b + ∆
2
and i∗(j̃) = ∅, uj̃ (̂i, sT ) ≥ 0, which contradicts T being the
last round of the MDP. Thus, µ(j̃) = b. Hence, ρ1
î
= b. We now conclude the argument in an
inductive manner: if ρk
î
= b for some k and all î that satisfy j∗(̂i) 6= ∅ and (i, j∗(̂i)) ∈ E, then by
construction ρk+1i = b. Thus, ρ∞i = b = pM(i, j). Thus, (i′, j) does not block M . Therefore, M is
stable with respect to pM .
Lemma 2. Let M be the matching generated by the MDP. Let pM be any price function such
that M is stable with respect to pM (which is well defined by lemma ) and let v be the associated
payment function. Let p∗M be the price generated by the PDP(I) and v∗ the corresponding payment
function. Then, v∗ ≤ v.
Proof. Let M , pM , v, p∗M and v∗ be as in the statement of the lemma. Then, for all i, v(i) ≥ ρ1i .
Indeed, if j∗(i) = ∅ then v(i) = b = ρ1i . If j∗(i) = j for some j then, by stability of M with respect
to pM , v(i) ≥ µ(j′) for each j′ such that i∗(j′) = ∅. Thus, v(i) ≥ ρ1i .
We now show that if v ≥ ρt for some k, then v ≥ ρt+1. Indeed, for all i such that j∗(i) = ∅,
v(i) = b = ρti = ρ
t+1
i . For all i such that j∗(i) = j, we have the following:
ρt+1i = max{ρti′ : (∃j′, i′)(i′, j′) ∈M and (i, j′) ∈ E}
≤ max{v(i′) : (∃j′, i′)(i′, j′) ∈M and (i, j′) ∈ E} ≤ v(i),
where the last inequality follows from stability of M with respect to pM . Thus, for each t and each
i, ρti ≤ v(i). Hence ρ∞· ≡ v∗(·) ≤ v(·).
We now prove items 1 through 4 of Proposition 1.
4 Indeed, let t be the last time j∗(̂i) bids for î. Then, st
î,j∗ (̂i)
= sT
î,j∗ (̂i)
, and st
î,j∗ (̂i)
≤ st
i,j∗ (̂i)
, where the
last inequality holds because buyers always bid for the cheapest sellers. By monotonicity of the matrix of prices,
st
i,j∗ (̂i)
≤ sT
i,j∗ (̂i)
. Thus, sT
î,j∗ (̂i)
≤ sT
i,j∗ (̂i)
.
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1. The algorithm ends in finite time.
Proof. By the same arguments as Crawford-Knoer, the matching determination program ends in
finite time. Furthermore, let K ∈ N satisfy max{µ(j) : j ∈ J } = b + K∆. Then the price
determination program ends in at most 2K rounds.
2. The algorithm outputs a pairwise stable matching.
Lemma 2 proves this item.
3. Price Determination program (I) outputs the pointwise minimum price func-
tion at which M is stable.
Proof. Let pM be the prices generated by the Price Determination program (I). By construction,
M is stable apM . The rest follows from lemma 2
4. Price Determination program (II) outputs the pointwise maximum price func-
tion at which M is stable. The result then follows from Lemmas 3 and 4
Lemma 3. Let M be the matching generated by the MDP, and let pM be the prices generated by
the PDP(II). M is stable with respect to pM .
Proof. Let M be the matching outputted by the matching determination program, and pM be the
prices generated by the price determination program. Assume (i, j) ∈ E, j∗(i) = i∗(j) = ∅. Since
there exists p̂M such that M is stable with respect to p̂M then µ(j) ≤ b. Thus (i, j) do not block
M at ρ∞. Now consider (i, j) ∈M . We show no seller and no buyer wishes to block (i, j):
a. No Buyer blocks: Let j′ be such that (i, j′) ∈ E. If i∗(j′) 6= ∅ then, by construction, ρ∞i∗(j′) ≤
ρ∞i , so (i, j′) does not block. Assume now that i∗(j′) = ∅. We say a seller i′ is indirectly
connected to seller j if there exists sequences (i1, ..., ik) and (j1, ..., jk−1) such that (i1, j) ∈ E,
(i1, j1) ∈ E, (i2, j1) ∈ E, ..., (ik, jk−1) ∈ E, with i′ = ik. That is, if a path can be constructed
from j to i′. By construction, min{µ(j∗(i′)) : i′ is indirectly connected to j} ≤ ρ∞i where, by
convention, µ(∅) = b. Now consider the abstraction used in Proposition 1: each matched
pair (̂i, ĵ) ∈M is assigned their own subgraph, and all unmatched buyers/sellers are assigned
a trivial subgraph that contains only them. Because there exist prices p̂M such that M is
stable at p̂M , cheapest sorting implies that
µ(j′) ≤ p̂M(i, j) ≤ min{v(i′) : i′ is indirectly connected to j}
≤ min{µ(j∗(i′)) : i′ is indirectly connected to j}.
Thus, µ(j′) ≤ ρ∞i so (i, j′) does not block.
b No Seller blocks: Let i′ be such that (i′, j) ∈ E. By construction, ρ∞i ≤ ρ∞i′ . Thus, (i′, j)
does not block.
Lemma 4. Let M be the matching generated by the MDP. Let pM be any price function such
that M is stable with respect to pM (which is well defined by our previous lemma) and let v be the
associated payment function. Let p∗M be the price generated by the PDP(II) and v∗ the corresponding
payment function. Then, v∗ ≥ v.
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Proof. Let M , pM , v, p∗M and v∗ be as in the statement of the lemma. Then, v(i) ≤ ρ1i for all i.
Indeed, if j∗(i) = ∅ then v(i) = b = ρ1i . If j∗(i) = j for some j then, by stability of M with respect
to pM , v(i) ≤ µ(j) = ρ1i .
We now show that if v ≤ ρt for some k, then v ≤ ρt+1. Indeed, for all i such that j∗(i) = ∅,
v(i) = b = ρti = ρ
t+1
i . For all i such that j∗(i) = j, we have the following:
ρt+1i = min{ρti′ : (i′, j) ∈ E}
≥ min{v(i′) : (i′, j) ∈ E} ≥ v(i),
where the last inequality follows from stability ofM with respect to pM . Thus, for each t and eaxh
i, ρti ≥ v(i). Hence ρ∞· ≡ v∗(·) ≥ v(·).
E On Efficiency and the Core
To conclude the theoretical analysis of pairwise stable matchings in our setup, we comment on
two related notions: efficiency of the matching, and core matchings.
In our model pairwise stable matchings are efficient, in the sense that they maximize total social
surplus. To see this, note that social surplus from a matchingM is given by
∑
(i,j)∈E Sp(i, j)1M(i, j),
where 1M is the indicator function of set M and Sp(i, j) is the surplus from j and i trading. Since
our model has no transaction costs, Sp(i, j) = µ(j)−µ(i). Therefore, for any network (I,J , E;µ),
M is efficient if, and only if, it solves the following problem:
max
 ∑
(i,j)∈E
(µ(j)− µ(i))1M(i, j) : M ∈M(E)
 , (E.1)
whereM(E) is the set of all one-to-one matchings restricted to the set of edges E.
To show that pairwise stable matchings solve the above problem, define an auxiliary surplus
function as Sp∗(i, j) = Sp(i, j) if (i, j) ∈ E and Sp(i, j) = −∞ if (i, j) /∈ E. Trivially:
max
 ∑
(i,j)∈E
Sp(i, j)1M(i, j) : M ∈M(E)
 = max
 ∑
(i,j)∈I×J
Sp∗(i, j)1M(i, j) : M ∈M(I × J )
 .(E.2)
Shapley and Shubik (1972) show that if M is pairwise stable then M maximizes the right hand
side of equation E.2. Thus, pairwise stable matchings in frictional economies are efficient in the
sense of maximizing total social surplus. As a corollary of the above result, given a fixed network,
(I,J , E;µ), any two pairwise stable matchings produce the same social surplus.
Another point of contact of our paper to standard matching models is the connection to the core
of the economy. In frictionless economies, an allocation is in the core of the economy if there is no
coalition of agents that can block the allocation. The main difference between core allocations and
pairwise stable allocations is that the core allows blocks by coalitions of any size, while pairwise
stability only allows for blocks by coalitions of size two. Furthermore, in a market with frictions
it is natural to include the condition that B0 × S0 is an admissible blocking coalition only if it is
a fully connected sub-graph of the original graph. Otherwise, we would allow non linked agents
to be part of a blocking coalition, which is contrary to the interpretation of what network links
represent.
A natural definition of the core for economies with frictions is as follows. Fix a network
(I,J , E;µ), a matching M , and a fully connected sub-economy (I0,J0, E0;µ) . If, for each price
function pM , the agents in (I0,J0, E0;µ) can find an alternative matching and price function that
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benefits some agents without hurting any agent, we say I0×J0 blocks M . Thus, M is in the core
if, for each fully connected sub-economy, M is unblocked.5
With the definition of the core as presented above, any pairwise stable matching is in the core.
Indeed, let M be pairwise stable and let I0×J0 be any fully connected sub-economy. By pairwise
stability, each trade that takes place in the I0 × J0 sub-economy takes place at the same price.
Furthermore, the only buyers that are unmatched in the I0×J0 sub-economy are the lowest value
buyers. Similarly, the only sellers that are unmatched are the highest cost sellers. Thus, I0 × J0
cannot block the matching M , and so M is in the core of the frictional economy.
F The case with negative gains from trade.
In the main text, we assume that linked agents in a network have positive gains from trade.
While this assumption is natural, and has been used in related works, in this appendix we drop the
assumption and obtain theorems analogous to 1 and 1. We do this in the interest of completeness.
For Proposition 1, the assumption is essentially without loss of generality. Intuitively, linked
agents that can’t engage in profitable trades (i.e. agents with negative gains from trade) do not
affect the set of pairwise stable matching, nor do they affect the prices that support the pairwise
stable matchings. The only agents that change the set of pairwise stable matchings, and their
supporting prices, are those that have 0 gains form trade. More formally, we proceed in three
steps. First, we define a matching that contains trivial matches. Second, for any given network,
N , we construct an alternative network, N̂ , by eliminating the links between agents that have
negative gains from trade. Third, we show that N and N̂ have the same set of stable matchings
up to matchings that contain trivial matches. Regarding Theorem 1, this theorem is without loss
of generality. That is, it is still true that a graph G satisfies the SLOP if, and only if, it satisfies
the M -AC for all matchings M such that (for some valuation profile) M is stable in the network
induced by G and the valuation profile. However, once we drop the assumption that linked pairs
have positive gains from trade, the set of matchings M that are pairwise stable (given a suitable
valuation profile) is now larger. When only positive gains from trade are allowed, only maximal
matchings are pairwise stable (given a suitable valuation profile), whereas now any matching is
pairwise stable (again, given a suitable valuation profile. In particular, this implies that the
complete graph is (essentially) the only graph where SLOP holds.
We begin by defining a matching with trivial matches. Say N is a network, and M is a
matching. We sayM contains trivial matches if there exists a pair (i, j) ∈M such that µ(i) = µ(j).
We call this a trivial match because any price at which i and j could trade is a price that leaves
them indifferent between trading and not trading.
Proposition 2. Let N = (I,J , E;µ) be a network. Let N̂ = (I,J , Ê, µ) be as follows: (i, j) ∈ Ê
and (j, i) ∈ Ê if, and only if, (i, j) ∈ E and µ(i) ≤ µ(j). Finally, let M ⊂ E be a an arbitrary
matching (in N ) that contains no trivial matches. Then, the following are true:
1 Matching M ⊂ E is pairwise stable in N if, and only, if M is pairwise stable in N̂ ,
2 pM supports M ⊂ E in N if, and only if, pM supports M in N̂ .
5An alternative way to define the core is to construct a fictitious economy as follows. First, all agents are linked
in this fictitious economy. Second, if two agents are not linked in the original economy, we say they generate
zero surplus, otherwise they generate surplus as in the original economy. In this fictitious economy, a matching
is in the core if, and only if, the matching is pairwise stable in the original economy. Notice, however, that while
these concepts are mathematically equivalent, they are conceptually different. In our model, links represent that
two agents cannot match. That is, links encode feasibility restrictions, which is a stronger statement than saying
“unlinked agents can match but generate zero surplus."
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Proof. Let N , N̂ be as in the statement of the Proposition. First, let M be pairwise stable in N ,
and let pM be any price function that supportsM in N . Notice that if (i, j) ∈M , then µ(i) ≤ µ(j),
because otherwise individual rationality of pM would fail. Because M contains no trivial matches,
µ(i) < µ(j). Thus, (i, j) ∈ Ê. Moreover, since there are no blocks to (i, j) in N , and because
Ê ⊂ E, then there are no blocks in N̂ . Thus, M is pairwise stable in N̂ at prices pM . Now, let M
be pairwise stable in N̂ , and let pM be any price function that supports M in N̂ . For an arbitrary
pair (i, j) ∈M , no links in Ê block (i, j). Let (i, j′) ∈ E \ Ê. Then, µ(i) > µ(j′) so (i, j′) does not
block (i, j). Similarly, no link of the form (i′, j) ∈ E \ Ê blocks (i, j). Thus, M is stable in N , and
pM supports it.
Proposition 3. Let G = (I,J , E) be a graph. Let M be any matching (not necessarily maximal).
Then, there is a valuation profile µ such that M is stable in network N = (I,J , E;µ).
Proof. Let G and M be as in the statement of the Proposition. For all i ∈ I and all j ∈ J such
that i∗(j) = j∗(i) = ∅, let µ(i) = 2, µ(j) = 0. For all other agents, let µ(i) = µ(j) = 1. Then, M
is stable in (I,J , E;µ) at prices pM(e) = 1 for all e ∈M .
The Proposition above highlights the conceptual role played by the assumption we placed on
gains from trade. Assuming that linked pairs have positive gains from trade yields a particular
structure to the set of matchings that can be made stable. Namely, only maximal matchings are
such that there exists a valuation profile at which they are stable. When we drop the assumption,
then any matching can be made pairwise stable, via choice of an appropriate valuation profile.
In turn, this means that the only graphs that satisfy the slop are the graphs such that, after
eliminating all agent that have no links, the remaining graph is complete.
Proposition 4. A graph G = (I,J , E) satisfies the SLOP if, and only if, the following property
holds: for all i, i′ ∈ I (i 6= i′) and all j, j′ ∈ J (j, 6= j′), if (i, j) ∈ E and (i′, j′) ∈ E, then
(i′, j) ∈ E and (i, j′) ∈ E.
Proof. Assume G is a graph that satisfies the SLOP. Let (i, j) ∈ E and (i′, j′) ∈ E, with i 6= i′ and
j 6= j′. Set µ(i) = µ(i′) = µ(j) = µ(j′) = 1 and µ(i′′) = 2 for all other i′′ ∈ I and µ(j′′) = 0 for
all other j′′ ∈ J . Set M = {(i, j), (i′, j′), (j, i), (j′, i′)}; then M is stable in the network induced
by G and µ. Thus, for all pM that support M , pM must be constant. Replicating the argument
made in Theorem 1, the above is true if, and only if, G|M satisfies the M -AC property. Thus,
G|M = ({i, i′}, {j, j′}, Ê) where Ê = (I × J ) ∪ (J × I).
G Example of unstable matching
In a continuous core, it is not true that the matching generated by Crawford and Knoer (1981)
and Kelso and Crawford (1982) algorithm is stable. The following is one such example where the
matching generated by the algorithms in Crawford and Knower, and Kelso and Crawford (say, M)
satisfies that there is no price function pM such that M is stable with respect to pM .
Let ν(j) = ν(j′) = 2∆ and ν(j′′) = ∆. With positive probability the algorithms in Crawford
and Knower, and Kelso and Crawford generate matching M = {(j, i), (j′′, i′′)} (marked in red)
with prices p(i, j) = 2 and p(i′, j′′) = 1. In the continuum this is not stable. Furthermore, in the
continuum there is no price function p̂M that makes this matching stable.
H Comparisons with the literature
H.1 Comparison with Fainmesser and Galeotti (2015)
In our paper, Proposition 1 states that there are two elements that drive price formation:
the fully connected subnetworks we can form, and the existence of links between a buyer in a
subnetwork and a seller in another subnetwork. Indeed, since each fully connected subnetwork
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Sellers
Figure A1: A matching produced by the algorithm in Crawford and Knoer (1981) and Kelso and
Crawford (1982) that is unstable in a continuous core in a market with frictions.
is akin to a competitive economy, these indicate regions of the graph where prices are constant.
Having identified these local regions of constant prices, the connections across subnetworks identify
which regions have lower prices than others: if a seller in a fully connected subnetwork (say, a) is
linked to a seller in another fully connected subnetwork (say, a′), then the price in a must be lower
than the price in a′. Otherwise, the buyer would not be trading with his counterpart in a. As a
consequence, many links may serve the same purpose (or be redundant), so the degree on a node
is not informative about whether that node will trade at a high or a low price.
In papers such as Fainmesser and Galeotti (2015), the force behind price formation is different.
In that paper, the seller is a monopolist, and every node is a buyer. Each buyer cares about their
consumption, but also about the consumption of its neighbors. A buyer is influential if many other
buyers care about his/her consumption; alternatively, a buyer is suceptible to influence if he/she
cares about the consumption of many other buyers. Being influential (or suceptible to influence)
is therefore deeply tied to the in/out-degree of the buyer.
The main reason why the forces that determine prices in our model is different than the forces
that determine prices in models such as Fainmesser and Galeotti (2015), is that the links represent
different objects. In Fainmesser and Galeotti (2015), the monopolist can sell to any consumer, and
the purchase of one consumer “infects" other consumers. Hence, the logic behind the arguments
in Fainmesser and Galeotti (2015) is akin to the contagion literature, where degree centrality is
paramount. In our paper links represent trading opportunities, so they encode outside options.
Law of One Price will hold if we can chain these outside options in appropriate ways, so that
we eliminate all arbitrage opportunities (either directly, or indirectly). In this sense, the logic
underlying our paper is closer to the literature on bridge walking: what kinds of paths from point
a to point a′ can we support in the graph? In this literature, degree centrality is not as relevant.
H.2 Comparison of abstractions with the decomposition in Corominas-
Bosch (2004)
We occasionally get asked about the difference between our abstractions and the decomposition
in Corominas-Bosch (2004) (henceforth CB). While her decomposition construction appears similar
to ours, there are at least four important differences:
(a) Corominas-Bosch decomposition does not identify redundant links. CB decom-
poses a network into a union of subnetworks, whereas we consider a completely different
network, whose nodes are associated with subnetworks of the original graph. While this
does not seem like a great difference, it hides a crucial difference in our decompositions: in
the CB decomposition, when a node in a subgraph is connected to another node in another
subgraph, CB keeps this information encoded in her construction; in our construction, the
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central message is that the identity of these two nodes is completely irrelevant, only their
existence is relevant. For more details on this, see the discussion in section 2.3 in the paper
on how we apply our proposition.
(b) The purpose of her construction is different. CB uses her decomposition to calculate
the Perfect Equilibrium Payoffs (PEP) of her bargaining game and to characterize the graphs
that sustain those PEP; in our paper, we use our decomposition result to characterize the
prices that sustain any given pairwise stable allocation.
(c) Corominas-Bosch does not require her subnetworks to be fully connected. If CB
required fully connected subnetworks her theorem would be false.
(d) The CB decomposition imposes constraints that are irrelevant for our purposes.
Corominas-Bosch proceeds in the following way: first, she defines a construction similar to
our abstractions; second, if a subnetwork in the construction has more sellers (resp. buyers)
than buyers (resp. sellers), she calls that subnetwork a “seller (resp. buyer) subnetwork",
and otherwise she calls it an “even subnetwork"; finally, she focuses only on decompositions
where the links across nodes of the different subnetworks join sellers (buyers) in a “seller
(buyer) subnetwork" to buyers (sellers) in another “seller (buyer) subnetwork" (see p.50 of
Corominas-Bosch (2004)). While an abstraction my coincide with a CB decomposition, this
is not always the case (see figure A2 for an example of an abstraction that does not satisfy
the CB construction). Since, for the purposes of her paper, it is useful to focus on this
special case, proving existence is non-trival and this is what her decomposition theorem
does. However, for our purposes, these special cases are not particularly useful. Figure
A2 shows an example of a network such that there exists no CB decomposition where each
subnetwork is fully connected. Furthermore, the abstraction that is useful for characterizing
the prices that sustain the proposed stable match does not satisfy the CB constraints. Since
we do not restrict what abstractions we focus on, existence is trivially guaranteed. However,
what is non-trivial is to understand how to associate pairwise stability in the original network
with pairwise stability in an abstraction, nor how this relationship allows us to construct the
algorithm we use for our simulations.
I Price Dispersion in Finite Random Networks
In this section, we investigate price dispersion in finite random networks. First we explain how
we simulate random networks. Then we discuss simulation results.
I.1 Simulation
As in the eBay application, there are three parameters in the seller-buyer model: the number
of buyers (J), the number of sellers (I), and the expected number of links per buyer (ELB).
We start the baseline simulation with I = 10, 000 identical sellers and J = 10, 000× θ hetero-
geneous buyers. Similar to the eBay application, we use a uniform [0, 100] for the distribution of
buyers’ valuations, which bounds the minimum and maximum prices between those values. We
consider markets with J ∈ [1000, 50000], so θ ∈ [0.1, 5]. We also consider markets with ELB
∈ [1, 10].6 The higher the ELB, the lower the frictions in the market. The product of the number
of buyers and the ELB determines the number of active links in the market. The total number of
6We obtain almost identical results: (i) using 1,000 or 100,000 sellers (instead of I = 10, 000); (ii) varying
expected links per seller, ELS (instead of varying the expected links per buyer, ELB); and using alternative
distributions (e.g. normal distribution truncated at 0 or a lognormal distribution, both with the same mean and
standard deviation as the uniform [0, 100]) for buyers’ valuations (instead of uniform [0, 100]). Results are available
upon request.
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Figure A2: An abstraction that does not satisfy the conditions in CB
An Abstraction in
Network Fully Connected Subnetworks
1
2
3
4
A
B
C
Buyers
Sellers 1
2
3
4
A
B
C
G
G′
G′′
Figure A3: The above network summarizes the differences between our abstractions and the CB
construction: (1) the CB construction keeps the information that seller 2 is linked to buyer B, the
purpose of our construction is to highlight that such information is irrelevant; If seller 2 were linked
to buyer C instead, nothing would change in our analysis. (2) this network can be decomposed
as stated in the CB theorem, but no decomposition involving only fully connected subnetworks
exists (3) let µ(A) > µ(B) > µ(C) so the match in bold is pairwise stable. The abstraction we
propose allows us to completely characterize the prices that sustain such a match, but this crucial
abstraction does not satisfy the CB constraints. Indeed, seller 2 belongs to a seller subnetwork
(G′) but is linked to a buyer in an even subnetwork (buyer B in subnetwork G′′ and buyer A in
subnetwork G).
possible links in the market is J × I. The proportion of active links relative to the total number
of possible links in a network is a measure of the sparsity of the network. Given the parameters
J , I, and ELB, a network is formed by randomly drawing buyers and sellers to form links. Once
the network is constructed, we apply the algorithm from Section 3.2 in the paper to the network.
As in the eBay application, the “bids” in the first stage of the algorithm take place on a grid of
possible prices with 2J grid points.
We compare the price distributions to the frictionless outcome (henceforth Walrasian outcome),
where all buyers are linked to all sellers. The Walrasian outcome price, pWalrasian, is given by:
pWalrasian =
{
0 if θ ≤ 1
(1− 1
θ
)× 100 if θ > 1.
Recall that the Walrasian outcome has a constant price (see Remark 1 in the paper). When θ ≤ 1,
there are more sellers than buyers and so there is always a seller who is indifferent between selling
the good at 0 or not selling it at all. In other words, the reservation price of the marginal seller is
zero, which is what determines the market price. When θ > 1, there are more buyers than sellers.
Only 1
θ
of the buyers buy the good. Hence the valuation of the marginal buyer is (1 − 1
θ
) × 100.
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This buyer is indifferent between paying (1− 1
θ
)× 100 and leaving the market, and so the market
price is (1− 1
θ
)× 100.
Figure A4: Distribution: Buyer-Preferred Prices.
Notes: Starting in the top left, panels 1 to 4 figure display the empirical distribution of prices from the model using the buyer-preferred match disaggregated
by: i) Market Tightness (which ranges from 0.1 to 5 in the horizontal axis in each graph) and ii) Expected Links per Buyer (1, 2, 3, and 5). Each vertical
box corresponds to a simulated market characterized by those parameters. Each vertical box displays the 95th percentile (upper whisker), 75th percentile
(upper hinge), median (black circle marker), 25th percentile (lower hinge), and 5th percentile (lower whisker). Note that buyers’ valuation is normalized
to range between 0 and 100 which, in turn, bounds the minimum and maximum prices between those values. If the 95th percentile coincides with the 5th
percentile, then the figure shows only a dot (which corresponds to the median too). In addition, each panel displays the Walrasian outcome, pWalrasian.
We describe how to calculate the Walrasian outcome in subsection I. The distributions for the seller-preferred prices, although stochastically dominating
the buyer-preferred prices, exhibit similar distributions. See online appendix for figures showing both distributions.
I.2 Results
Distribution of Prices. Figure A4 displays the distribution of prices for the buyer-preferred
match by market tightness (horizontal axis in each panel) and ELB (different panels). Each
vertical box corresponds to a simulated market characterized by those parameters. Each panel
shows the population distribution of prices for different levels of frictions in different markets. The
top-left panel shows the price distribution for high frictions, where ELB equals 1. The top-right
and bottom panels show what happens in markets with lower frictions (when ELB equals 2, 3,
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and 5, respectively). At low levels of θ there are many sellers for each buyer. So low numbers for θ
indicate “loose” seller markets where sellers are at a disadvantage. In addition, each panel displays
the Walrasian outcome.
For market tightness less than one, the market looks like a monopsony and nearly all sellers
are paid their valuation. This is because it is unlikely for a seller to receive multiple links. Even if
a seller receives two links, it is likely that at least one of the buyers has an outside option of zero.
This happens if the buyer is also linked with another seller who has no other links.
On the other hand, as market tightness is increased the market becomes more competitive
between buyers and more favorable for sellers. The median price increases as does price dispersion.
There are now many buyers linked to each seller and the buyers have worse outside options. Even
if a buyer is linked to a second seller, it is likely that the second seller is linked to many other
buyers. In markets with lower frictions, competition between buyers increases, thus increasing
prices until they reach the Walrasian outcome.
Price Dispersion and the Walrasian Outcome. Price dispersion decreases when frictions
decrease. There are many buyers linked to each seller, but there are also many sellers linked to
each buyer, improving the outside options of both parties. These improved outside options reduces
price dispersion (i.e. the likelihood that a seller has to take a low price is low, but at the same time
the probability that a buyer has to pay a high price is also low). The top panel in Figure A7 shows
the evolution of the price distribution for the buyer-preferred match. It shows the price percentile
difference (95th percentile minus 5th percentile or P95 − P5) when θ = 3. Almost identical results
are obtained for other values of θ. While there is price dispersion when ELB ≤ 4, the price
distribution begins to collapse for larger values of ELB. When ELB = 5, ninety percent of the
prices are equal to the Walrasian outcome. Likewise, when ELB = 8, ninety-nine percent of the
prices are equal to the Walrasian outcome. In other words, at least 90 percent or 99 percent of
the sellers are paid the same price when the number of active links relative to the total number of
links is only 5/10,000 or 8/10,000, respectively. The price distribution in the model collapses with
less than 0.1 percent of the possible links in the network.
Price Dispersion in Finite-Sized Random Networks. Figure A7 shows how price dispersion
depends on the market size, market tightness, number of links, and the structure of the network
(Poisson and non-Poisson random networks). We use the 95th-5th percentile difference in prices as
our measure of price dispersion.7 The top panel shows the finite-network properties of proposition 2
in subsection 2.5 in the paper, where the market tightness is θ = 3, the expected links per buyer
is ELB=λ × n = ( logn+log logn+cn
n
) × n, and we use cN = ± log log(N) + c. Results are similar for
other values of θ. The three lines correspond to three rates at which λ monotonically goes to zero
under the conditions of the proposition in subsection 2.5 in the paper:
- if cN = − log log(N) + c, then P(Hamiltionian Cycle) = 0 as N →∞,
- if cN = c, then P(Hamiltionian Cycle) ∈ (0, 1) as N →∞,
- if cN = + log log(N) + c, then P(Hamiltionian Cycle) = 1 as N →∞.
Our analysis of finite-sized random networks shows that: (1) price dispersion can disappear
even in finite-sized markets; (2) price dispersion decreases even when the probability that a buyer
meets a seller goes to zero too fast to guarantee a Hamiltonian cycle asymptotically.8
7Results are similar if we use other percentile differences or the fraction of prices that are equal to the Walrasian
price. Results are available upon request.
8In the online appendix we show that price dispersion does not change with the size of the market when ELB
is fixed.
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The bottom panels investigate how price dispersion depends on market tightness (θ), ELB,
and the structure of the network. The bottom left panel shows the price dispersion in markets with
Poisson random networks, where every seller has equal probability of drawing a link (λij = λ).
The bottom right panel shows the price dispersion in non-Poisson random networks, where sellers
have different probabilities of receiving a link. We chose a distribution of probabilities such that
the lowest probability seller receives links at half the rate than the average probability seller, and
the highest probability seller receives links at twice the rate than the average probability seller.9
To summarize, our analysis of finite random networks shows the following. (1) Price dispersion
in these networks is large when ELB is small. (2) Price dispersion decreases rapidly as buyers are
linked to more sellers. This has implications for policies that reduce frictions as price dispersion
decreases quickly with the number of links. (3) The structure of the network matters. The
non-Poisson markets have substantially higher levels of price dispersion compared to the Poisson
markets. This indicates that policies that affect how buyers and sellers meet can be important in
decreasing price dispersion, as discussed in our eBay application in the previous section.
I.3 Additional Figures for Study of Finite Random Networks
I.4 Buyer-Seller Model
Price Distribution: Buyer- vs. Seller-Preferred Matches. Figure A6 shows that similar
results to the ones in Figure 1 in the paper are obtained using the seller-preferred match. Figure A6
displays, for each market tightness, the distribution of prices using both the seller- and the buyer-
preferred match. (For the buyer-preferred match, each vertical box in Figure A6 is identical to the
corresponding vertical box in Figure A4.) When ELB equals 5, the 95th and 5th price percentiles
coincide with the Walrasian outcome for both the buyer- and the seller- preferred match. The
prices in the buyer-preferred matching represents the lower bound of the set of prices that support
each match. Likewise, the prices in the seller-preferred match represents the upper-bound of
the set of prices that support each match. Since both the seller-preferred and buyer-preferred
price distributions mimic the Walrasian outcome when ELB=5, it must be true that the price
distribution in any allocation that supports a pairwise stable match must also mimic the Walrasian
outcome.
9Specifically, let j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10, 000} index sellers from lowest probability to highest probability of receiving a
link. The non-Poisson random networks are generated by setting the probability that seller j receives a link with
buyer i relative to the probability that seller j = 10, 000 (the highest probability seller) receives a link with buyer i
to: λijλi10,000 = 0.25 + 0.75
j
10,000 .
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Figure A5: Price Dispersion in Finite-sized Random Networked Markets
Poisson Random Networks Non-Poisson Random Networks
Notes: The figure displays the price dispersion for simulated random markets. The top panel shows the finite-network properties of proposition 2 in
subsection 2.5 in te paper, where the market tightness (θ) is set to 3 and the expected links per buyer is ELB=λ ∗ n = ( log n+log log n+cn
n
) ∗ n and we use
cn = ± log log(N) + c. Results are similar for other values of θ. The bottom panels show how the price dispersion in random markets with 10,000 sellers
depends on θ, ELB, and the random network formation process. The figure on the bottom left shows the price dispersion in markets with Poisson random
networks, where every seller has equal probability of drawing a link (λ). The figure on the lower right, shows the price dispersion in non-Poisson random
networks, where sellers have different probabilities of receiving a link. Let j ∈ {1, 2, .., 10000} index sellers from lowest probability to highest probability of
receiving a link. The non-Poisson random networks are generated by setting the relative probability that seller j receives a link (compared to the highest
probability seller j = 10000) to
Prj
Pr10000
= 0.25 + 0.75 j
10000
.
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Figure A6: Price Distribution: Buyer- vs. Seller-Preferred Matches.
Notes: At each market tightness, panels 1 to 4 display the distribution of prices in the model using the sellers
and the buyer-preferred match. For the seller-preferred match, each vertical box in this figure is identical to the
corresponding vertical box in Figure A4. In addition, each panel displays the Walrasian outcome, pwalras. We
describe how to calculate the Walrasian outcome in subsection I. See the notes in Figure A4 for a description of the
vertical boxes.
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Finite-Sample Convergence Properties of Random Networked Markets.
Figure A7: Finite-Sample Convergence Properties of Random Networked Markets
Notes: The figure shows that convergence does not depend on the size of the market when ELB is fixed.
References
Alvarez, F., and G. Barlevy (2014): “Mandatory Disclosure and Financial Contagion,” Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago.
Ausubel, L. M., and P. R. Milgrom (2002): “Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding,” Frontiers of Theoretical Economics,
1(1), 1.
Babus, A., and P. Kondor (2013): “Trading and Information Diffusion in Over-the-Counter Markets,” Working Paper.
Bertsekas, D. P. (1992): “Auction algorithms for network flow problems: A tutorial introduction,” Computational Optimization and
Applications, 1(1), 7–66.
Corominas-Bosch, M. (2004): “Bargaining in a Network of Buyers and Sellers,” Journal of Economic Theory, 115, 35–77.
Crawford, V. P., and E. M. Knoer (1981): “Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers,” Econometrica, 49, 437–450.
Fainmesser, I. P., and A. Galeotti (2015): “Pricing network effects,” The Review of Economic Studies, 83(1), 165–198.
Gale, D., and L. S. Shapley (1962): “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage,” American Mathematical Monthly, 69,
9–15.
Gofman, M. (2011): “A Network-Nased Analysis of Over-the-Counter Markets,” Working Paper.
Hatfield, J. W., and F. Kojima (2008): “Matching with Contracts: Comment,” American Economic Review, 98, 1189–94.
(2010): “Substitutes and Stability for Matching with Contracts,” Journal of Economic Theory, 145, 1704–1723.
Hatfield, J. W., and P. R. Milgrom (2005): “Matching with Contracts,” American Economic Review, 95, 913–935.
Kakade, S. M., M. Kearns, and L. E. Ortiz (2004): “Graphical economics,” in Learning Theory, pp. 17–32. Springer.
Kakade, S. M., M. Kearns, L. E. Ortiz, R. Pemantle, and S. Suri (2004): “Economic properties of social networks,” in
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pp. 633–640.
Kelso, A. S., and V. P. Crawford (1982): “Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes,” Econometrica, 50,
1483–1504.
Malamud, S., and M. J. Rostek (2013): “Decentralized Exchange,” University of Geneva.
Roth, A. (2008): “Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions,” International Journal of Game
Theory, Special Issue in Honor of David Gale on his 85th birthday, 537–569.
Roth, A., and M. Sotomayor (1990): Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Econometric
Society Monograph Series , Cambridge University Press.
Shapley, L., and H. Scarf (1974): “On Cores and Indivisibility,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1, 11–26.
Shapley, L., and M. Shubik (1972): “The Assignment Game I: The Core,” Econometrica, 1, International Journal of Game Theory.
A-19
